Argentina in its Postwar: Challenges and Missed Opportunities

Conditions are being created for any policy that weakens the military instrument. Argentina did not abolish the Armed Forces, but since 1983 it has 'disarmed' its capacity for influence, its strategic power, and its industrial infrastructure, generating what Harbulot (6) calls a 'national power vacuum', easily exploitable in the logic of economic warfare. The 'revolutionary' control of Power - the effect of political 'entryism' - produced the crisis/decline. Period 2001/2025 and its unexploited opportunities. In the last two decades, strategic opportunities - 'equivalent to victories' - have also been unexploited because the Castro-communism or '21st-century socialism' - inefficient and corrupt - only cared about its permanence. He who does not know how to manage it ceases to be a victor. Argentina, at several critical moments in its history, gained advantages or suffered defeats, but lacked a sustained post-war project, understood as a state's political-strategic mission. Internal and external legitimacy. Tacitus and Liddell Hart warned that a victor who humiliates the defeated or neglects civilians sows the seeds of the next war. Civil-military command unity. Without clear political leadership, tactical victory dissolves. Post-war times require governance, not just operations. D. There was no interruption of the constitutional order. In conclusion: Argentina had purely civilian coups, without military support, which are not considered 'coups d'état'. All successful coups - 1930 / 1976 - were civilian/military in their gestation or backing, except that of 1943. - anticipation of a handover of command -. There was social chaos and political pressure. But there was no coup, neither civilian nor military. 1989. Small Politics: For much of the last seven decades, Argentina has been trapped in 'small politics', in the struggle for positions, budgets, or privileges. It is necessary to briefly address this topic. It was precisely at that moment - 1983 - that 'civil/military relations' (3) were imposed as 'civil control of the Armed Forces'. The false foundation used was the existence of 'military dictatorships, arising from military coups'. Civil-military relations, if adequate, are at the same time a factor for internal concord and institutional effectiveness, in matters of Defense. Military interruption of the constitutional order. 1976 – Against Isabel Perón. Business, ecclesiastical, and political sectors accompanied. The book 'The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations' was written by Samuel P. Huntington and originally published in 1957, as a result of his doctoral thesis at Harvard, being a seminal work in civil-military relations that proposes the professionalization - as objective control - of the Armed Forces.. (5). The doctrinal lesson is unequivocal: the exploitation of victory - and the intelligent management of defeat - are permanent strategic functions, not episodes. Here are the two central challenges for Mr. Lt. Gen. Presti, Minister of Defense, after the mid-term elections. 'The final result of a war is not found in military victory, but in the subsequent peace'. CITATIONS AND CLARIFICATIONS:(1). Today Chile - a British satellite - is in the Atlantic. These are the challenges facing the new Minister of Defense, and Milei/Presti should emulate the epic of Roca/Ricchieri, who achieved the 'quintessence' of a military strategy: 'they won a war without unsheathing the sword'. Today one must win 'national pacification'. It is opportune to recall in this regard, Gen. De Gaulle - 1944 -: 'The true difficulty is not winning the war, but building peace'. It encompasses a policy of long-term historical horizon, reorients the collective destiny, mobilizes the nation as a historical unit - not as factions -. What happened in successive governments from 1983 to the present - except for short voter reactions -? On 06 Aug 08, with the approval of Law 26.394 promoted by the terrorist minister Nilda Garré and the Executive Power of 'Her' - today condemned -, the Code of Military Justice was repealed and with it the special jurisdiction - the military jurisdiction, support of military command in operations - and the Military Tribunals of the Armed Forces were extinguished. IT WAS A GREAT SUCCESS OF OUR ALLIED ENEMIES, IN FULL POSTWAR. A total change is urgent. THE CHALLENGES FACING THE TE. Roca advanced towards him and they hugged for a long time. Thus the unity of the political regime around Roca was consecrated, and with it: Mutual support between Mitre and Roca in negotiations with Chile. Internal stabilization that facilitated the signing of the May Pacts - 1902 -. The political defeat of sectors promoting military confrontation. The consolidation of the PAN for another decade. Gen. Roca had appointed – in Jul 1900 – Minister of War and Navy to the young Col - he had been promoted in 98 - 'on active duty' Pablo Richieri, who achieved the approval of Law No. 4.031 -06 Dec 1901– the so-called 'Richieri Law' that established compulsory military service - he accompanied it in the following years with a package of norms that completed and corrected its application and organized the Forces-. The cruiser docked in Dársena Norte before a large crowd and a political delegation. Mitre, already elderly - 79 years old -, came down to the pier in person to welcome him. But public language affects ideas and the 'hypocritical revolution' - for decades - has imposed - from the State - a distorted language, which has become naturalized. The latest electoral results 2023/25 clearly express that TRUTH, PEACE AND JUSTICE MUST BE RECOVERED. Half a century ago Prof. S. P. Huntington published 'The Soldier and the State' (4). Let's see what the truth is: 1930 – Coup against Yrigoyen. Strong civilian support: conservative sectors, media, universities, Supreme Court. He bet on a WWIII, which did not come. The case 1959/1989: Castro-communist invasion. Gen. has it, since he was appointed by the one who had to authorize it. The most thorny questioning arose from the emerging situation of the defeat in the South Atlantic and the consequent collapse of the Government of the Process, the arrival at the Presidency of the Nation - 1983 - of a man from the PRT - 'Revolutionary Party of Workers' - and therefore a defender of the ERP - 'People's Revolutionary Army' -, at the precise moment when a double postwar begins that has not yet been known or assumed by the sovereign. Everything in the short term, in the immediacy, in the electoral. The effects of these laws recreated the Armed Forces, modernizing them and Chile, which had four Army divisions deployed in front of Neuquén and Mendoza, returned to its barracks and negotiated the Boundary Treaties. On 14 May 1904 a large concentration of conscripts swore allegiance to the Flag in Campo de Mayo- After the ceremony the people cheered President Julio A. Roca and Minister Pablo Richieri and, in that climate, Roca was requested to promote Richieri to the rank of General. Four days later - on 19 May 1904 - Richieri was promoted to Brigadier General. Self-coup attempt - assault on RIMec 3 - to try to prevent the presidential elections. It was intended to simulate a military coup. 2001 – Resignation of De la Rúa. There was no constitutional break. In 1974 a 'non-conventional counter-revolutionary' war was opened -improvisationally- without strategic direction. Gen. Heriberto Justo Auel December 2025 'The final result of a war is not found in military victory, but in the subsequent peace.' Carl von Clausewitz -1780/1831-1. ARGENTINA IN ITS POSTWAR TIMES. 2. THE CHALLENGES FACING THE TE. In 1983/84, to the 'tactical view' and 'belligerent ignorance', was added the social-democratic ideological purpose of 'alfonsinism', guided by Dante Caputo. Let's see what the entire political arc agreed upon in Olivos, year 1984(6): 'Reserved' consensus of the political class - radical, justicialist and other forces -: The Armed Forces must be totally withdrawn from decision-making centers; The military budget is dispensable, in the face of the economic crisis; The national security industry is not a priority; Strategic security can be 'outsourced' to diplomatic relations. The cultural climate - universities, press, NGOs - will be oriented to legitimize the reduction of military power. External pressure - UK and Human Rights Organizations - favors 'light' security models, fiscal austerity, and economic opening. There is a new internal conditioning: after the dictatorship, social antimilitarism. He must develop the Military Strategy, the great decisions to achieve the productive model for Defense, education, international insertion, and the moral organization of society for National Security to recover the capacity to generate a strategic course: development, international adscription, generational cohesion, and reconstruction of the State. That is, to recover the Pax, to think of the Nation again in terms of destiny and not of faction. In it he pointed out two categories of 'civil control' over the Armed Forces. The execution was military (Uriburu). 1943 – Coup of the GOU. It was the only purely military one. It gave rise to the appearance of 'peronism'. 1955 – 'Liberating Revolution'. Broad anti-peronist civilian support. Those resources were not transformed into infrastructure, institutional capital, nor defense of the maritime interest. · The exceptional geopolitical position - water, lithium, food, energy traceability, etc.- Natural advantages that require a coordinated project between the State, the Armed Forces, and the productive sector, to become power. In summary: Argentina has had objective-material, natural or technological- victories, but it has almost never converted them into cumulative strategic advantages. Military doctrinal reflection on the 'exploitation of victory' In Polemology - from Sun Tzu to contemporary NATO Doctrine - 'exploiting the victory' was and is the critical phase in which the victor: Transforms tactical action into a political result, under strategic direction, Consolidates control, Prevents the recovery of the adversary, Builds a favorable and stable peace. The second seeks the 'militarization of the military' and is related to their sterilization or political neutralization in the barracks. The latter is the Presti case. A victory is not exploited only by occupying territory, but by defining a new political framework more favorable to the intervener. C. Clarity of political objectives. Clausewitz insisted: the political objective must govern the exploitation of the military. Some of our experiences have been the following: The case 1945: Argentina in the post-WWII period: Foreign victory, own defeat - or 'political defeat of neutrality' - Argentina arrived at the end of WWII with material advantages: a stable productive apparatus, reserves, foodstuffs critical for the world war effort, and a valuable geostrategic position in the South Atlantic. However: The late break with the Axis - Mar 45 - prevented the political capitalization of the negotiating position. US pressure isolated the country from the post-war institutional design - Bretton Woods, OAS, UN, in their first technical commissions -. Argentine diplomacy reacted instead of proposing: it lacked a project for the strategic exploitation of its position. Result: Argentina did not transform its relative advantages into international rank or structural insertion, in the new order. Equality is the basis of the tax and public burdens'. For the first time in decades, Argentina will have - as of Dec 10 25 – a Minister of National Defense who meets the only condition that the Constitution demands: IDONEITY. And that condition is not merely a formal or entry requirement, but a plural notion that combines technical, professional, physical, and even moral/ethical aptitudes. The May Pacts: in the second government of Gen. Julio A. Roca (1898–1904) were the most important diplomatic tool to achieve: · Consolidate the Patagonian border; · Stabilize relations with Chile; · Foster economic and railway integration; · Keep Argentina aligned with the British balance in the South Atlantic. (8). Therefore, they are particularly relevant when in a political community operate factors of internal discord, linked with external threats to security and when internal political groups seek to dispute the State's sovereignty, through violence. Daily we hear or read in the media cite the 'military coup' or the 'military dictatorship'. This fallacy has been socially imposed by brainwashing conducted by Castro-communism, within 'political correctness'. The 'pseudo-revolutionary neo-Marxist' always governed Argentina 'in its postwar times', except for brief periods. Its most notable effect is the denial of the existence of that war in the TTOOFF and the absence of 'recognized veterans', despite being a civil war of fifteen years duration. The case 1982: defeat and incomplete postwar. The Falklands War offers an inverse example: it is not about exploiting a victory, but about intelligently managing the defeat, what Clausewitz and Liddell Hart deal with as an essential part of the restoration of balance. After the defeat: There was no post-war design that would synchronize defense, diplomacy, technological development, and social cohesion. The 'natural' democratic transition normalized the defeat. It turned it into a national agenda of strategic recovery -. There was a resignation in the middle of a political-social collapse driven by two senators - leaders of political parties. 2008 – Conflict with the field - Resolution 125-. There was economic blockade, protests, and severe political pressure. We have said -repeatedly- in these pages, that postwar times are an essential part of wars. 'Practical' mentalities - that act without thinking- understand that wars end with combat. The post-83 institutional crises were not 'classic' coups, because there was no interruption of the Constitution or armed coercion. The destitution was executed by the Army. 1966 – Against Illia. Broad civilian-corporate support - industrial corporations, media, part of unionism-. Coup carried out by the Armed Forces. There were cases of attempted purely civilian coups-not considered coups d'état! for not having military participation!. Let's see: 1989. In that sense IDONEITY means 'competence or sufficiency technical, professional and moral' to perform the office. And for this he only needs an authorization, which in fact Mr. Lt. Gen. He won all the battles and in 1984 Alfonsín 'distorted' the tactical victory into a political/strategic defeat - Decree 158/83 - which the combined British/Castro-communist enemy - in the postwar - still retains in 'exploitation'. And also Machiavelli, who in 'The Prince' said - 1532 -: 'Victories are won with the sword, but are preserved with solid institutions'. The Roca/Richieri epic took place after the 'embrace of concord', an episode that took place in the Port of Buenos Aires - when Roca returned from Europe -. Kk, prevalent in the hegemonic political group in the last two decades and clearly exposed in the recent ceremony of taking office of the new national deputies. Our 'military ethics' is established since always in the Code of Honor Sanmartiniano(5) and in the inherited national culture, symbolically represented in our sky-blue and white flag, with the Inca Sun in its center and expressed in our Constitution. Long-term deterrence. Exploiting victory means leaving a structure of force, alliances, and rules that prevent the repetition of war. In conclusion: Both the Argentine experience and military doctrine coincide on a central idea: Victory is not a fact, it is a process. Therein lies the difference between the 'strategic vision' and the 'tactical view' - in the military environment and in the idoneity or ignorance in the political sphere - regarding belligerent issues. Let's see what those 'strategic opportunities' were: The scientific-technological human capital - nuclear, space, satellite-. Objective advantages that did not become a structural regional leadership due to ideologicalization and lack of political-strategic continuity. The agro-export boom and the terms of trade - 2003–2010-. In that case he can 'perform public or private functions, unrelated to military activities, as long as they are compatible with the dignity and military rank.' In Conclusion: a military man on active duty is prohibited from accepting public office - or jobs unrelated to military activities - without prior authorization. We enter the current helplessness. The post-82 military disarticulation created a gap between real military capacity and declared diplomatic ambition. Consequently: The defeat was not transformed into a regenerative strategic capital - as it happened with Japan, Germany, or even Vietnam - The hypocritical verbal claim was preserved, but no power instruments were built to sustain it. H. J. Auel. 'Civil-military relations, the necessary reconstruction of the State and the indispensable national, regional, and continental security'. PRESTI AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE. ARGENTINA IN ITS POSTWAR TIMES. December 11, 2025 - Total News Agency - TNA– Article 16 of the Argentine National Constitution states: 'The Argentine Nation admits no privileges of birth, nor of nobility: there are in it personal privileges nor titles of nobility. (9) The Argentine Military History offers paradigmatic cases of non-exploitation of advantages and poor management of defeats, both relevant to understand the country's difficulties in turning critical junctures - military, diplomatic, or economic - into effective and lasting power.. Both cases are the ones the new Minister of Defense has on his desk. PRESTI AS MINISTER OF DEFENSE. We headed this essay with a Clausewitz expression from 1832 - in 'On War' -: 'The final result of a war is not found in military victory, but in the subsequent peace'. A complement to it is a Churchill phrase: 'Victory is not the end. To do this: The central doctrinal elements are: A. Rapidity in the transition. Every victory generates a 'moment of political plasticity': the order has not yet solidified and the victor can impose conditions. And - as early as 1947 - Gen. George Marshall told us 'The post-war policy requires as much energy and foresight as the war itself'. As we see, the importance of postwar times - always - has been central.: the 'subjective civil control', which consists of the maximization of civilian power and the 'objective civil control', which is achieved by the maximization of military professionalism. The first category has normally been linked to the search for military support for partisan politics - case Milani - through a party member in command. Until 1974 it was considered 'common crime', under police treatment. On the situation of 'retirement' Article 9 regulates the rights/restrictions when a military man is in retirement. It is only the beginning of a more arduous obligation: to preserve it', expressed almost a century later. The overthrow was carried out by the Armed Forces. 1962 – Against Frondizi. Civil pressure from the UCR of the People and anti-peronist sectors. They hold their offices in the scope of the Grand Policy (1) and not of the Partisan Small Policy (2). Article 6 - of Law 19.101 - defines that 'activity' is the situation in which 'the military personnel has the obligation to render military service'.. The first corresponds to the Statesman and the second to the 'partisan' leader. Minister Presti plays in the first scenario. F. M. Vélez: 'To posterity: martial personality of Lieutenant General don Julio A. Roca'. The President is of the Nation, not of a party and his Ministers - by extension - are also. Article 7 of Law 19.101 defines the duties of the military 'on active duty'. Among them: 'The non-acceptance nor the performance of positions, functions or jobs unrelated to military activities, without prior authorization of the competent military authority.' Well: whoever appoints him - the Cte J FFAA - automatically authorizes him. Without connection to the historical destiny and the 'great decisions'. (3). In addition, the author points out 'two levels of civil-military relations': a level of 'relative power' and a level of 'ideological character'. It is this last one that we want to underline in our critical situation. All its inhabitants are equal before the law, and admissible to employment with no other condition than fitness. C. Harbulot. 'Economic Warfare in the 21st Century'. E. That same article 7 provides that he cannot accept nor hold 'elective public office' nor 'participate in the activities of political parties'. The office of Minister is not elective and does not enter into a 'partisan' activity, but 'institutional'. A 'conjunctural economic victory' with large fiscal resources that today the Justice is trying to recover. The immediate consequence was the 'delivery' of the Beagle Channel and the break of the principle 'Chile in the Pacific, Argentina in the Atlantic' achieved in the 'May Pacts'(7). Institutional crisis 1989. The effective exploitation is always legitimate, or at least acceptable. E. And he did it. Reconstruction and security simultaneously. Current stabilization doctrine - COIN, peace operations and 'stability operations' -: there is no victory if the recomposition of civil order is not achieved. F. I was a firsthand witness of the coup preparation by the UCR in Córdoba. Between Nietzsche and Aron: between the 'great historical horizon' and 'political rationality'. (2). Quintessence: In the Middle Ages, alchemy takes up the term 'quintessence' to refer to the purest or most concentrated essence of a substance. It was that which was sought to be extracted as its fundamental virtue. The most essential, pure or perfect of something. (9). To assume the office as Minister, he only needs an authorization, which in fact Mr. Lt. Gen. It is a matter of establishing whether the 'military ethics' is compatible with the 'ethics? The Code of Honor Sanmartiniano: San Martín imposed his Code of Honor shortly after founding the Regiment of Grenadiers on Horseback, created by decree of 07 Mar 1812. The Code was promulgated that same year, as an internal mandatory regulation for all officers and troop, even before their first combat in San Lorenzo, in 1813.(6). Losing that moment means losing the victory. B. Grand Politics: According to Friedrich Nietzsche -1887–1888– his notion of 'Grosse Politik', 'grand' refers to the policy of historical destiny and 'small' to the daily, partisan or parliamentary politics. of the Age. Apr 25.(7). Araujo, Bs. As. 1938CICCUS. Ago 2013.www.ieba.org(4). Ed./Imp.: Tall. Gráf. As. GRL. GRL. Gen.