Politics Events Local 2026-03-05T19:54:56+00:00

Argentina and Iran: Distrust After the AMIA Attack

The article analyzes a public statement by Mohsen Rabbani, indicted for his involvement in the AMIA attack. The author argues that Argentina, with its historical memory, cannot trust promises of friendship from a figure linked to one of the country's worst terrorist attacks. It is emphasized that Rabbani's words should be considered in the context of his past and Iran's overall policy, not as sincere assurances.


Therefore, when a defendant linked to the worst terrorist attack on Argentine soil asks for trust and offers 'friendship,' the country has every reason to be distrustful. The country has memory: the AMIA attack left a devastating toll, and the case accumulated for years accusations, indictments, and requests for international detention against Iranian citizens and others involved. When a defendant accused of terrorism offers himself as a bridge of friendship and attempts to give lessons on 'truth,' Argentina cannot respond with naivety. The comment, apparently light, serves as a normalization tool: to present Iran as an actor 'like any other,' integrated into the global calendar, while a high-intensity conflict unfolds and, for Argentina, the names that refer to the open wound of the AMIA reappear. In this context, the Argentine challenge is not to overact with panic or to feed fantasies, but to sustain a basic principle of strategic prudence: to evaluate messages from the Iranian regime—and those who represent or justify them—in the light of their track record, not their slogans. For years, Iran claimed its uranium enrichment was for peaceful purposes, while restricting inspections, delaying explanations, and accumulating material increasingly close to the military threshold. 'It was them,' he stated, while describing internal manifestations under the slogan 'God is Greater' and speaking of '800 murders' suffered by his country since the beginning of the conflict. The most political segment of his message was aimed at legitimizing the Iranian power system. In a context of maximum tension in the Middle East and a reconfiguration of power in Tehran, the phrase sounded designed to lower defenses: 'For us, Argentines are friends,' he said in an interview broadcast by the streaming channel AZZ, and presented himself as someone who 'loves the Argentine people.' The problem for Argentina is not just the literal content of that promise, but who formulates it and from what political tradition. Rabbani is not a neutral commentator: his name has appeared for decades in the judicial file and in international arrest warrants linked to the 1994 attack. The rhetorical turn is known: to present Tehran as a victim, accuse third parties of aggression, and demand credibility. Buenos Aires - March 5, 2026 - Total News Agency - TNA - Mohsen Rabbani, former cultural attaché of the Iranian embassy in Argentina and indicted by Argentine justice as one of those involved in the plot against the AMIA, returned to the scene with a message of apparent calm: he stated that it is 'incorrect' to affirm that Argentina can be a 'target' of Iran due to President Javier Milei's international alignment with the United States. In other words: even with protocols and verification mechanisms, the world discusses what Iran does because Iran does not fully show what it does. Not out of prejudice, but out of experience: the Iranian regime's track record in strategic information, international commitments, and transparency is marked by concealment, manipulation, and double discourse. The mere mention of Rabbani's words should raise alerts in Argentina. Luis D'Elía and Fernando Esteche in Tehran with Moshen Rabbani, the Argentines that Rabbani 'wants.' In his public intervention, Rabbani sought to shift the focus: he suggested it would be 'very good' for the Argentine government to 'stand on the side of truth' within the framework of the war facing the United States, Israel, and Iran. In the same move, he tried to wrap the mourning over the death of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei—confirmed after the coordinated attacks by the United States and Israel on February 28—in a heroic narrative: he defined him as a 'great political sage' and 'hero,' assured he did not take refuge in special facilities and remained 'active' until the end, in a 'public place.' But for Argentina, the central point is not how Rabbani rebuilds the image of Iranian leadership, but what he seeks with his message and what objective conditions exist to believe him. In that framework, the words 'friendship' and 'we are not a target' cannot be taken as guarantees; they are, at a minimum, discursive pieces within a damage control strategy, especially when the region is experiencing an open war and Tehran is trying to manage its external image after the political and symbolic blow that implied the death of the supreme leader. Argentine distrust becomes even more reasonable if one looks at the track record of public statements by the Iranian regime in other sensitive areas, especially nuclear. He called President Donald Trump a 'dictator,' recommended he 'return to sanity,' and claimed Iran is 'a democratic government' because it has elected parliaments and a mechanism for selecting its leader. And that pattern—promising one thing, hiding another, admitting only when there is no longer any margin—is exactly the one that sets off all the alarms in Buenos Aires when an informal spokesperson for the Iranian apparatus asks to 'believe' in his word. The interview also included an unexpected, almost amiable, touch with a football nod: Rabbani said that the Iranian national team 'will be in North America' to participate in the upcoming World Cup in June. Recent history teaches that the cost of believing too quickly is often paid too dearly. The discussion has ceased to be abstract: recent reports from international organizations and technical reconstructions indicate high enrichment levels—including 60% material—and a stock whose magnitude, according to widely circulated evaluations in diplomatic circles, could drastically reduce the time needed to reach a weapons-grade level if there were political will. In that chapter, the figure of Rafael Grossi, Director General of the IAEA (the UN's nuclear agency), became key: the organization has long been demanding full cooperation, access, and inspections to be able to give credible guarantees about the fate of the nuclear material and the continuity of the enrichment activity. 'We have not invaded any country or started to attack.'