With a low public profile, partial activity in the private sector, and ties that were not cut with the libertarian core, the former coordinating minister is testing a return to the forefront of politics while the ruling party's internal reordering continues around the “iron triangle” and the rising figure of advisor Santiago Caputo. Since his departure, Franco has avoided sustained exposure, limited his interventions on social media, and been selective with media appearances. For his detractors, his cycle came to an end with his internal defeat against the presidential advisor and the formation of the General Secretariat. Meanwhile, the ruling party seeks to maintain governability with economic and legislative reforms that require votes and internal discipline. Before his departure, Franco had served as the classic articulator with the political system and the interlocutor with provincial governors. Within the ruling coalition, this is explained as a long-term policy reorganization; behind the scenes, allies and detractors debate whether the rearmament is about efficiency or power accumulation. A former police officer, he built power within the intimacy of Peronism through networks of loyalty, control over state levers—especially in intelligence and the Federal Police—and a remarkable ability to influence decisions without always occupying the formal center of the stage. That role, his circle assures, has been blurred by the new scheme, in which the Chief of Staff concentrates coordination functions but “political control”—according to interpretations circulating in the ruling coalition—rests on a double ring: first, Karina Milei's party-building, and then Santiago Caputo's strategic apparatus. In that tension, Franco's figure appears as an actor waiting for an opening. In the libertarian world and its allies, the discussion persists about who manages relations with governors, Congress, and economic sectors. In that scenario, Franco's reappearance depends not only on his will but on whether the Government needs to rebalance the board with a classic negotiator or if it consolidates power concentrated in the innermost circle. After the fall of Isabel Perón's government in 1976, he went into exile, was arrested years later, and died in prison while facing judicial processes. Those who speak with Franco state that he closely follows the Government's pulse, celebrates some legislative advances, and at the same time accumulates reservations about the decision-making scheme that consolidated after his departure. He maintained strong power over the media. His name became associated above all with the Argentine Anticommunist Alliance (Triple A), a parapolice apparatus accused of carrying out a campaign of persecution and political assassinations in the 70s against leftist activists, combative unionists, intellectuals, journalists, and opponents. His collaborators reject that he is seeking a diplomatic post or a retirement abroad and hint that he has already resumed contacts in the province of Buenos Aires, where the ruling party's power battle is projected toward 2027. In parallel, the former official has let his circle know that he divides his time with private activities, including his business participation in Ovo Prime, dedicated to egg production in the Buenos Aires interior, a retreat that combines political prudence with his own economic support. Silence does not imply disengagement. On that same map, Franco's entourage mentions displacements and realignments in state agencies and companies that, in his view, have left figures linked to his management without a margin in the decision-making structure. The internal struggle, moreover, is not limited to the Caputo–Karina Milei dispute. Even so, he maintained contacts with the President and did not entirely break his institutional presence: he remained linked to the board of YPF, although with changes in his role after Manuel Adorni—already as Chief of Staff—assumed state representation with the “golden share” and veto power within the oil company. For the ruling coalition, the reform is justified in terms of modernization and coordination; for critics, it concentrates sensitive tools in a politically volatile context. In parallel, the nuclear area has become another chapter in the Caputist advance. For those loyal to Franco, the former Chief of Staff still retains assets: knowledge of the state, personal ties with Milei, and an understanding of parliamentary maneuvering. There, armed libertarians coexist with figures from PRO and operators of territorial Mileism. José López Rega (1916–1989) was a former Federal Police corporal whom Perón appointed as General Commissioner and who became an operator, known for having been Minister of Social Welfare during Juan Domingo Perón's third government and for his enormous influence over María Estela Martínez de Perón (“Isabel”). The creation of the Nuclear Affairs Secretariat and the appointment of Federico Ramos Nápoli were read in different offices as a new milestone of control over strategic sectors. Buenos Aires, February 17, 2026 - Total News Agency - TNA - It has been just over three months since Guillermo Franco left the Chief of Staff after resigning from President Javier Milei and abandoning the daily life of power in the Casa Rosada, but in his entourage, they assure that the leader does not see himself as retired. The comparison with López Rega, repeated by allies of the former Chief of Staff as a political summary of fear and obedience, exposes the central fact: more than a personal conflict, what is being discussed is the power model in the Milei era— who puts or removes names from the inner table. In that characterization, the central argument is not a formal position but the fear that, they claim, the advisor inspires in sensitive areas of the state: “he manages a lot” and “the others are afraid of him,” repeat in a low voice those who were part of the former minister's political apparatus. The comparison, used in political circles as a metaphor for a “black monk” capable of conditioning internal careers, is potentiated by a succession of movements attributed to Caputo. In this context, close to the former Chief of Staff, they established an explosive definition: they describe Santiago Caputo as a “modern López Rega,” a comparison loaded with historical meaning that seeks to graph—according to that view—an informal, transversal power exercised from the shadows. For that role, he was impeached in cases for crimes against humanity. After Franco's departure, the advisor reinforced his gravitation in the universe of state intelligence and security: DNU 941/2025, published at the beginning of January, reconfigured central aspects of the intelligence system and revived opposition questions about the scope of powers and the new organizational chart.
